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Abstract
We show the existence of involuntary unemployment based on consumers’ utility
maximization and firms’ profit maximization behavior under monopolistic compe-
tition with increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale technology using a
three-period overlapping generations (OLG) model with a childhood period as well
as younger and older periods. We also analyze the effects of fiscal policy financed
by tax and budget deficit (or seigniorage) to realize full-employment under a situ-
ation with involuntary unemployment. We show the following results. 1) In order
to maintain the steady state where employment increases at some positive rate, we
need a budget deficit (Proposition 1). 2) If the full-employment state is realized, we
do not need budget deficit to maintain full-employment (Proposition 2). We also
show that involuntary unemployment occurs in the Nash equilibrium.
Keywords: Involuntary unemployment, Three-period overlapping generations
model, Monopolistic competition, Nash equilibrium
1. Introduction
In this paper we analyze the effects of fiscal policy to realize full-employment
under a situation with involuntary unemployment. Involuntary unemployment in
this paper is a situation where workers are willing to work at the market wage or
just below but are prevented by factors beyond their control, mainly, deficiency of
aggregate demand. Umada (1997) derived an upward-sloping labor demand curve
from themark-up principle for firms, and argued that such an upward-sloping labor
demand curve leads to the existence of involuntary unemployment without wage
rigidity1. But his model of firm behavior is ad-hoc. Otaki (2009) says that there
1Lavoie (2001) presented a similar analysis.
exists involuntary unemployment for two reasons: (i) the nominal wage rate is set
above the reservation nominal wage rate; and (ii) the employment level and eco-
nomic welfare never improve by lowering the nominal wage rate. He assume in-
divisibility (or inelasticity) of individual labor supply. If labor supply is indivisible,
it may be 1 or 0. On the other hand, if it is divisible, it takes a real value between
0 and 1. As discussed by Otaki (2015) (Theorem 2.3) and Otaki (2012), if the labor
supply is divisible and very small, no unemployment exists2. However, we show
that even if labor supply is divisible, unless it is so small, there may exit involun-
tary unemployment. We consider consumers’ utility maximization and firms’ profit
maximization in an overlapping generations (OLG)model undermonopolistic com-
petition according to Otaki (2011) and Otaki (2015), and demonstrate the existence
of involuntary unemployment without the assumption of wage rigidity.
Also we analyze the effects of fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit (or
seigniorage). We show the following results.
1. In order to maintain the steady state where employment and output increases
at some positive rate, we need a budget deficit. (Proposition 1)
2. If the full-employment state is realized, we do not need budget deficit tomain-
tain full-employment. (Proposition 2)
From these results we can say that in order to realize full-employment from a state
with involuntary unemployment we need budget deficit of the government. How-
ever, when full-employment is realized, in order to maintain full-employment we
need balanced budget. Therefore, additional government expenditure to realize fill-
employment should be financed by seigniorage not public debt. If it is financed by
public debt, this debt should not be redeemed. It should be bought by the central
bank. In this case money supply increases under constant prices of goods.
In the next section we analyze and show the existence of involuntary unemploy-
ment under monopolistic competition with increasing or decreasing or constant
returns to scale technology using a three-periods OLG model with a childhood pe-
riod as well as younger (working) and older (retired) periods. Also we consider pay-
as-you go pension system for the older generation. In a simple two-periods OLG
model falling of the nominal wage rate and the prices of goods may increase con-
sumption and employment by the so-called real balance effect. In such a model con-
sumers have savings for future consumption, but not debt. In a three-periods model
with childhood period they consume goods in their childhood period by borrowing
2About the indivisible labor supply also please see Hansen (1985).
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money from consumers of the previous generation, andmust repay their debt in the
next period. Real value of the debt is increased by falling of the nominal wage rate
and the prices, and consumptions and employmentmay decrease. In addition to this
configuration we consider a pay-as-you go pension system for the older generation
which may reduce the savings of consumers. We think our model is more realis-
tic than a simple two-periods OLG model. In Section 3 we examine the effects of
a decrease in the nominal wage rate. In our three-period OLG model with pay-as-
you-go pension an increase in consumption and employment due to falling of the
nominal wage rate and the prices of goods might be small or even negative. In Sec-
tion 4 we study the fiscal policy financed by tax and budget deficit (or seigniorage) to
realize full-employment at a state with involuntary unemployment. We also show
that involuntary unemployment occurs in the Nash equilibrium in Section 5.
As we will state in the concluding remarks, the main limitation of this paper is
that the good is produced by only labor and there exists no capital and investment
of firms. A study of the problem of involuntary unemployment and fiscal policy in
such a situation is the theme of future research.
2. Existence of involuntary unemployment
2.1. Consumers
We consider a three-period (0: childhood, 1: younger or working, and 2: older
or retired) OLGmodel under monopolistic competition. It is a re-arrangement and
an extension of the model put forth by Otaki (2007), Otaki (2009), and Otaki (2015).
The structure of our model is as follows.
1. There is one factor of production, labor, and there is a continuum of perish-
able goods indexed by 𝑧 ∈ [0, 1]. Good 𝑧 is monopolistically produced by
firm 𝑧 with increasing or decreasing or constant returns to scale technology.
2. Consumers consume the goods during the childhood period (Period 0). This
consumption is covered by borrowing money from the younger generation
and the government scholarship. They must repay these debts in their Period
1. However, unemployed consumers cannot repay their own debts. There-
fore, we assume that unemployed consumers receive unemployment benefits
from the government, which are covered by taxes on employed consumers of
the younger generation.
3. During Period 1, consumers supply 𝑙 unit of labor, repay the debts and save
money for their consumption in Period 2. They also pay taxes for the pay-as-
you go pension system for the older generation.
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4. During Period 2, consumers consume the goods using their savings carried
over from their Period 1 earnings, and receive the pay-as-you go pension,
which is a lump-sum payment. It is covered by taxes on employed consumers
of the younger generation.
5. Consumers determine their consumptions in Periods 1 and 2 and the labor
supply at the beginning of Period 1. We assume that their consumption during
the childhood period is constant.
We use the following notation.
𝐶𝑒𝑖 : consumption basket of an employed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝐶𝑢𝑖 : consumption basket of an unemployed consumer in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑐(𝑧)𝑒𝑖 : consumption of good 𝑧 of an employed consumers in Period 𝑖.
𝑐(𝑧)𝑢𝑖 : consumption of good 𝑧 of an unemployed consumers in Period 𝑖.
𝐷: consumption basket of an individual in the childhood period, which is constant.
𝑃𝑖: the price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝑝(𝑧)𝑖: the price of good 𝑧 in Period 𝑖, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝜌 = 𝑃2
𝑃1
: (expected) inflation rate (plus one).
𝑊 : nominal wage rate.
𝑅: unemployment benefit for an unemployed individual. 𝑅 = 𝐷.
?ˆ?: consumption basket in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝑄: pay-as-you-go pension for an individual of the older generation.
Θ: tax payment by an employed individual for the unemployment benefit.
?ˆ?: pay-as-you-go pension for consumers of the younger generation when they retire.
Ψ : tax payment by an employed individual for the pay-as-you-go pension.
Π: profits of firms which are equally distributed to each consumer.
𝑙: labor supply of an individual.
Γ(𝑙): disutility function of labor, which is increasing and convex.
𝐿: total employment.
𝐿𝑓 : population of labor or employment in the full-employment state.
𝑦(𝐿𝑙): labor productivity, which is increasing or decreasing or constant
with respect to “employment × labor supply” (𝐿𝑙).
We assume that the population 𝐿𝑓 is constant.
We consider a two-step method to consider utility maximization of consumers
such that:
1. Employed and unemployed consumers maximize their utility by determining
consumption baskets in Periods 1 and 2 given their income over two periods:
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2. Then, theymaximize their consumption baskets given the expenditure in each
period.
We define the elasticity of the labor productivity with respect to “employment
× labor supply” as follows,
𝜁 =
𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝐿𝑙
.
We assume that −1 < 𝜁 < 1, and 𝜁 is constant. Increasing (decreasing or constant)
returns to scale means 𝜁 > 0 (𝜁 < 0 or 𝜁 = 0).
Since the taxes for unemployed consumers’ debts are paid by employed con-
sumers of the same generation, 𝐷 and Θ satisfy the following relationship.
𝐷(𝐿𝑓 − 𝐿) = 𝐿Θ.
This means
𝐿(𝐷 + Θ) = 𝐿𝑓𝐷.
The price of the consumption basket in Period 0 is assumed to be 1. Thus, 𝐷 is the
real value of the consumption in the childhood period of consumers.
Also, since the taxes for the pay-as-you-go pension system are paid by employed
consumers of younger generation, 𝑄 and Ψ satisfy the following relationship:
𝐿Ψ = 𝐿𝑓𝑄.
The utility function of employed consumers of one generation over the three
periods is written as
𝑢(𝐶𝑒1, 𝐶
𝑒
2, 𝐷) − Γ(𝑙).
We assume that 𝑢(·) is a homothetic utility function. The budget constraint is
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2 = 𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ .
Similarly, the utility function of unemployed consumers is
𝑢(𝐶𝑢1 , 𝐶
𝑢
2 , 𝐷).
Their budget constraint is
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2 = Π − 𝐷 + 𝑅 + ?ˆ?
Since 𝑅 = 𝐷,
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2 = Π + ?ˆ?.
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The consumption baskets of employed and unemployed consumers in Period 𝑖 are
𝐶𝑒𝑖 =
(∫ 1
0
(
𝑐(𝑧)𝑒𝑖
) 𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
, 𝑖 = 1, 2,
and
𝐶𝑒𝑖 =
(∫ 1
0
(
𝑐(𝑧)𝑢𝑖
) 𝜎−1
𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
𝜎 is the elasticity of substitution among the goods, and 𝜎 > 1.
The price of consumption basket in Period 𝑖 is
𝑃𝑖 =
(∫ 1
0
(𝑝(𝑧)𝑖)
1−𝜎 𝑑𝑧
) 1
1−𝜎
, 𝑖 = 1, 2.
Let
𝛼 =
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
1 − 𝛼 =
𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
Since the utility functions 𝑢(𝐶𝑒1, 𝐶
𝑒
2, 𝐷) and 𝑢(𝐶
𝑢
1 , 𝐶
𝑢
2 , 𝐷) are homothetic, 𝛼 is deter-
mined by the relative price 𝑃2
𝑃1
, and do not depend on the income of the consumers.
Therefore, we have
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑒
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑒
2
=
𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
𝑃1𝐶
𝑢
1 + 𝑃2𝐶
𝑢
2
,
From the first order conditions and the budget constraints for employed and un-
employed consumers we obtain the following demand functions for consumption
baskets.
𝐶𝑒1 = 𝛼
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
, 𝐶𝑒2 = (1 − 𝛼)
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃2
,
and
𝐶𝑢1 = 𝛼
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, 𝐶𝑢2 = (1 − 𝛼)
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃2
.
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Lagrange functions in the second step for employed and unemployed consumers are
ℒ
𝑒
1 =
(∫ 1
0
(
𝑐(𝑧)𝑒1
) 𝜎
𝜎−1 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
−𝜆𝑒1
[∫ 1
0
𝑝(𝑧)1𝑐(𝑧)
𝑒
1𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ )
]
,
ℒ
𝑒
2 =
(∫ 1
0
(
𝑐(𝑧)𝑒2
) 𝜎
𝜎−1 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
−𝜆𝑒2
[∫ 1
0
𝑝(𝑧)2𝑐(𝑧)
𝑒
2𝑑𝑧 − (1 − 𝛼)(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ )
]
,
ℒ
𝑢
1 =
(∫ 1
0
(
𝑐(𝑧)𝑢1
) 𝜎
𝜎−1 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑢1
[∫ 1
0
𝑝(𝑧)1𝑐(𝑧)
𝑢
1𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
]
,
and
ℒ
𝑢
2 =
(∫ 1
0
(
𝑐(𝑧)𝑢2
) 𝜎
𝜎−1 𝑑𝑧
) 𝜎
𝜎−1
− 𝜆𝑢2
[∫ 1
0
𝑝(𝑧)2𝑐(𝑧)
𝑢
2𝑑𝑧 − 𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
]
.
𝜆𝑒1, 𝜆
𝑒
2, 𝜆
𝑢
1 and 𝜆
𝑢
2 are Lagrange multipliers. Solving these maximization problem, the
following demand functions of employed and unemployed consumers are derived.
𝑐(𝑧)𝑒1 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ )
𝑃1
𝑐(𝑧)𝑒2 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)2
𝑃2
)−𝜎
(1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ )
𝑃2
𝑐(𝑧)𝑢1 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝛼(Π + ?ˆ?)
𝑃1
and
𝑐(𝑧)𝑢2 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)2
𝑃2
)−𝜎
(1 − 𝛼)(Π + ?ˆ?)
𝑃2
From these analyses we obtain the indirect utility functions of employed and unem-
ployed consumers as follows:
𝑉 𝑒 = 𝑢
(
𝛼
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
, (1 − 𝛼)
𝑊𝑙 + Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃2
, 𝐷
)
− Γ(𝑙),
and
𝑉𝑢 = 𝑢
(
𝛼
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, (1 − 𝛼)
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃2
, 𝐷
)
.
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Let
𝜔 =
𝑊
𝑃1
, 𝜌 =
𝑃2
𝑃1
.
Then, since the real value of 𝐷 in the childhood period is constant, we can write
𝑉 𝑒 = 𝜑
(
𝜔𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
, 𝜌
)
− Γ(𝑙),
𝑉𝑢 = 𝜑
(
Π + ?ˆ?
𝑃1
, 𝜌
)
,
𝜔 is the real wage rate. Denote
𝐼 = 𝜔𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
. (1)
The condition for maximization of 𝑉 𝑒 with respect to 𝑙 given 𝜌 is
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
𝜔 − Γ′(𝑙) = 0, (2)
where
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
= 𝛼
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑒1
+ (1 − 𝛼)
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐶𝑒2
.
Given 𝑃1 and 𝜌 the labor supply is a function of 𝜔. From (2) we get
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
=
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
𝜔𝑙
Γ′′(𝑙) −
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
𝜔2
. (3)
If 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, the labor supply is increasing with respect to the real wage rate 𝜔.
2.2. Firms
Let 𝑑(𝑧)1 be the total demand for good 𝑧 by younger generation consumers in
Period 1. Then,
𝑑(𝑧)1 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎 𝛼(𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝐷 − 𝐿Θ + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿Ψ )
𝑃1
=
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎 𝛼 (𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄)
𝑃1
.
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This is the sum of the demand of employed and unemployed consumers. Note that
?ˆ? is the pay-as-you-go pension for younger generation consumers in their Period
2. Similarly, their total demand for good 𝑧 in Period 2 is written as
𝑑(𝑧)2 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)2
𝑃2
)−𝜎 (1 − 𝛼) (𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄)
𝑃2
.
Let 𝑑(𝑧)2 be the demand for good 𝑧 by the older generation. Then
𝑑(𝑧)2 =
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎 (1 − ?¯?) (?¯? ?¯?𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓 Π¯ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿𝑓 ?¯?)
𝑃1
,
where ?¯? , Π¯, ?¯?, 𝑙 and ?¯? are the nominal wage rate, the profits of firms, the employ-
ment, the individual labor supply, the debt of an individual, and the pay-as-you-go
pension, respectively, during the previous period. ?¯? is the value of 𝛼 for the older
generation. 𝑄 is the pay-as-you-go pension for consumers of the older generation
themselves. Let
𝑀 = (1 − ?¯?)
(
?¯? ?¯?𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓 Π¯ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄 − 𝐿𝑓 ?¯?
)
.
This is the total savings or the total consumption of the older generation consumers
including the pay-as-you-go pensions they receive in their Period 2. It is the planned
consumption that is determined in Period 1 of the older generation consumers. Net
savings is the difference between 𝑀 and the pay-as-you-go pensions in their Period
2, as follows:
𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄.
Their demand for good 𝑧 is written as
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝑀
𝑃1
. Government expenditure con-
stitutes the national income as well as the consumption of the younger and older
generations. Then, the total demand for good 𝑧 is written as
𝑑(𝑧) =
(
𝑝(𝑧)1
𝑃1
)−𝜎
𝑌
𝑃1
, (4)
where 𝑌 is the effective demand defined by
𝑌 = 𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿𝑙 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Note that ?ˆ? is consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝐺 is the government expenditure, except for the pay-as-you-go pensions, scholar-
ships and unemployment benefits (see Otaki (2007), Otaki (2015) about this demand
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function). Now, we assume that 𝐺 is financed by seigniorage similarly to Otaki
(2007) andOtaki (2009). In a later section, wewill consider the government’s budget
constraint with respect to taxes.
Let 𝐿 and 𝐿𝑙 be employment and the “employment× labor supply” of firm 𝑧. The
total employment and the total “employment × labor supply” are also∫ 1
0
𝐿𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿,
∫ 1
0
𝐿𝑙𝑑𝑧 = 𝐿𝑙.
The output of firm 𝑧 is 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙). At the equilibrium 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝑑(𝑧). Then, we have
𝜕𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝(𝑧)1
= ( 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙 𝑦′)
𝜕(𝐿𝑙)
𝜕𝑝(𝑧)1
.
From (4)
𝜕𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝(𝑧)1
= −𝜎
𝑑(𝑧)
𝑝(𝑧)1
.
The profit of firm 𝑧 is
𝜋 (𝑧) = 𝑝(𝑧)1𝑑(𝑧) −
𝑑(𝑧)
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
The condition for profit maximization is
𝜕𝜋 (𝑧)
𝜕𝑝(𝑧)1
=𝑑(𝑧) +
©­«𝑝(𝑧)1 −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
𝑦′𝑑(𝑧)
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)2
𝑊
ª®¬
𝜕𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝(𝑧)1
=𝑑(𝑧) +
©­«𝑝(𝑧)1 −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
+
𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)+𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊
ª®¬
𝜕𝑑(𝑧)
𝜕𝑝(𝑧)1
=𝑑(𝑧) − 𝜎
(
𝑝(𝑧)1 −
𝑊
𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙 𝑦′
)
𝑑(𝑧)
𝑝(𝑧)1
= 0
Therefore, we obtain
𝑝(𝑧)1 = −
𝜎
(1 − 𝜎 )(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
Let 𝜇 = 1
𝜎
. Then,
𝑝(𝑧)1 =
1
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊.
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This means that the real wage rate is
𝜔 = (1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙). (5)
With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to scale, 𝜔 is increasing (decreasing
or constant) with respect to “employment × labor supply” 𝐿𝑙.
From (1), (2) and (5), we have
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − Γ′(𝑙) = 0,
with
𝐼 = (1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙 +
Π − 𝐷 − Θ + ?ˆ? − Ψ
𝑃1
.
Then, from (3)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
=
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
𝑑𝜔
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
=
[
𝜕𝜑
𝜕𝐼
+
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)𝑙
]
(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦′
Γ′′(𝑙) −
𝜕2𝜑
𝜕𝐼2
[(1 − 𝜇) (1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦′]2
.
Assuming 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝜔
> 0, with increasing (decreasing) returns to scale 𝑦′ > 0 (𝑦 < 0), this
is positive (negative). Since
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 + 𝐿
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
, (6)
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑑𝑙
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
=
(
𝑙 + 𝐿
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
)
𝑑(𝑙)
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
.
Thus,
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
=
𝑙
1 − 𝐿
𝑑(𝑙)
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
𝑑(𝑙)
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
.
Usually 𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
and
𝑑(𝑙)
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
have the same sign, and we assume
𝑑(𝐿𝑙)
𝑑𝐿
> 0 in (6). Also we
assume
𝑑(𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙))
𝐿𝑙
= 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) + 𝐿𝑙 𝑦′ > 0. (7)
Then, the output 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increases by an increase in 𝐿.
Since all firms are symmetric,
𝑃1 = 𝑝(𝑧)1 =
1
(1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
𝑊. (8)
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2.3. Involuntary unemployment
Aggregate supply of the good is equal to
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝑓Π = 𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙).
Aggregate demand is
𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
=𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Since they are equal,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀,
or
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
1 − 𝛼
.
In real terms3
𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
, (9)
or
𝐿𝑙 =
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
.
We define a function
𝜓 (𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
.
Since 0 ≤ 𝐿 ≤ 𝐿𝑓 and 0 ≤ 𝑙 ≤ 1, we have 0 ≤ 𝐿𝑙 ≤ 𝐿𝑓 𝑙. Thus, the equilibrium value
of 𝐿𝑙 is obtained as a fixed point of 𝜓 (𝐿𝑙).
From (2) and (3) the individual labor supply 𝑙 is a (usually increasing) function of
𝜔. From (5) 𝜔 is a function of 𝐿𝑙. With increasing (decreasing or constant) returns to
scale technology it is increasing (decreasing or constant) with respect to 𝐿𝑙 or with
3 1
1−𝛼
is a multiplier.
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respect to 𝐿 given 𝑙. The individual labor supply 𝑙 may be increasing or decreasing
in 𝐿 or 𝐿𝑙. However, we assume that 𝐿𝑙 is increasing in 𝐿. This requires
𝑑𝐿𝑙
𝑑𝐿
= 𝑙 +
𝑑𝑙
𝑑𝐿
> 0.
It means 𝐿𝑙 < 𝐿𝑓 𝑙 for 𝐿 < 𝐿𝑓 . The equilibrium value of 𝐿𝑙 cannot be larger than 𝐿𝑓 𝑙.
However, it may be strictly smaller than 𝐿𝑓 𝑙. Then, we have 𝐿 < 𝐿𝑓 and involuntary
umemployment exists.
If we consider the following budget constraint for the government with a lump-
sum tax 𝑇 on the younger generation consumers4,
𝐺 = 𝑇,
aggregate demand is
𝛼
(
𝑊𝐿 + 𝐿𝑓Π − 𝐺 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
=𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝐺 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
Then, we obtain5
𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ (1 − 𝛼)𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
.
2.4. Discussion summary
The real wage rate depends on the employment elasticity of the labor productiv-
ity and the employment level. But the employment level does not depend on the real
wage rate. The real aggregate demand and the employment level are determined by
the value of
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
𝑃1
. (10)
If employment is smaller than the labor population, then involuntary unemploy-
ment exists.
4Of course, only employed consumers pay the taxes.
5This equation means that the balanced budget multiplier is 1.
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2.5. The case of full-employment
4
If 𝐿𝑙 = 𝐿𝑓 𝑙, full-employment is realized. Then, (9) is re-written as
𝐿𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑓 𝑙) =
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
. (11)
Since 𝐿𝑓 and 𝐿𝑓 𝑙 are constant (if 𝐿 = 𝐿𝑓 , 𝜔 is constant) for one generation, this is an
identity not an equation. On the other hand, (9) is an equation not an identity. (11)
should be re-written as
𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀
(1 − 𝛼)𝑃1
≡ 𝐿𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑓 𝑙).
This yields:
𝑃1 =
1
(1 − 𝛼)𝐿𝑓 𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑓 𝑙)
[𝛼
(
−𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
)
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀].
Then, the nominal wage rate is determined by:
𝑊 = (1 − 𝜇)(1 + 𝜁 ) 𝑦(𝐿𝑓 𝑙)𝑃1.
3. Effects of a decrease in the nominal wage rate
In this paper’s model, nomechanism determines the nominal wage rate except at
the full-employment state. For example, when the nominal value of𝐺 increases, the
nominal aggregate demand and supply increase. If the nominal wage rate rises, the
prices also rise. If, when 𝐺 increases, the prices rise considerably, then the outputs
might not increase and involuntary unemployment might not decrease. If the prices
do not rise or rise only slightly, involuntary unemployment decreases.
Let us examine the effects on employment of a decrease in the nominalwage rate.
A decrease in the nominal wage rate induces a decrease in the prices of the goods
(see (8)), and it does not directly rescue involuntary unemployment. Proposition 2.1
in Otaki (2016) says
Suppose that the nominal wage sags. Then, as far as its indirect effects
on the aggregate demand are negligible, this only results in causing a
proportionate fall in the price level. In otherwords, a fall in the nominal
wage never rescues workers who are involuntarily unemployed.
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However, indirect effects on aggregate demand due to a fall in the nominal wage rate
may exist. We assume that falling of the nominal wage rate and the prices are not
predicted by consumers. If the prices of the goods fall, the real value of the older
generation’s savings increases. But, at the same time, a decrease in the prices of the
goods increase the real value of the younger generation consumers’ debts.
The real values of the following variables will be maintained evenwhen both the
nominal wage rate and the prices fall.
𝐺/𝑃1: the government expenditure.
?ˆ?/𝑃1: consumption in the childhood period of a next generation consumer.
𝑄/𝑃1: pay-as-you-go pension for an older generation consumer.
?ˆ?/𝑃1: pay-as-you-go pension for a younger generation consumer when he retires.
On the other hand, the nominal value of 𝐷 and that of 𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄, which is the
older generation’s net savings, does not change. Therefore, from (10), whether the
fall in the nominal wage rate increases or decreases the effective demand depends
on whether
𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄 − 𝛼𝐿𝑓𝐷 (12)
is positive or negative. This is the so-called real balance effect. If 𝐷 or 𝑄 is large,
(12) is negative, and the fall in the nominal wage rate increases involuntary unem-
ployment6.
4. Several steady states
4.1. Steady state with constant employment under constant prices
First consider a steady state where the employment is constant. If 𝜂𝐿 < 𝐿𝑓 ,
involuntary unemployment exists even at the steady state. With constant employ-
ment the real wage rate and labor supply are not changed, thus the output is also not
changed. We assume also 𝜌 = 1, that is, the constant prices of the goods. Consumers
correctly predict that the prices are constant. Let 𝑇 be the tax revenue which is not
necessarily equal to 𝐺. Then,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀. (13)
At the steady sate it must be that ?ˆ? = 𝐷 and ?ˆ? = 𝑄. Thus,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷
]
+ 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀. (14)
6The discussion in this section is from the different perspectives of the real balance effect for
which the argument was fought by Pigou (1943) and Kalecki (1944).
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The savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go pension is equal
to 𝑀. Therefore,
(1 − 𝛼)
[
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷
]
= 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝑀 = 𝑀.
This means that:
𝐺 − 𝑇 = 0.
Therefore, to maintain a sate with constant employment and prices we need bal-
anced budget.
4.2. Steady state with an increase in output by fiscal policy under constant price
Next, consider a steady state where the employment 𝐿 and the output 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)
increase by fiscal policy. We assume constant prices of the goods again. Consumers
correctly predict that the prices are constant.
If the employment 𝐿 increases, labor supply 𝑙, the real wage rate 𝜔 and the labor
productivity 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increase in the case of increasing returns to scale. However, in
the case of decreasing returns to scale labor supply, the real wage rate and the labor
productivity may decrease. In the former (latter) case the rate of increase in the
output is probably larger (smaller) than that the rate of increase in the employment.
But we assume that both are positive (see (7)). Let 𝜂 − 1 > 0 be the rate of increase
in the output.
In this case (14) holds, too. The savings of the younger generation including the
pay-as-you-go pension must be equal to 𝜂𝑀. Therefore,
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷] = 𝐺 − 𝑇 + 𝑀 = 𝜂𝑀.
This means that:
𝐺 − 𝑇 = (𝜂 − 1)𝑀.
From this we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In order to maintain the steady state where employment and output
increase at some positive rate (𝜂 − 1 > 0), a budget deficit is required.
Let𝐺′ and𝑇 ′ be the government expenditure and tax revenue in the next period,
(13) is written as
𝑃1𝜂𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝜂𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷] + 𝐺
′ + 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝜂𝑀.
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Suppose that the savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go
pension in the next period is equal to 𝜂2𝑀. Then,
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃1𝜂𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷] = 𝐺
′ − 𝑇 ′ + 𝜂𝑀 = 𝜂2𝑀,
and we obtain
𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ = 𝜂(𝜂 − 1)𝑀.
This is the budget deficit which is necessary to realized an increase in employment
in the next period.
On the other hand, if we suppose that the savings of the younger generation
including the pay-as-you-go pension is equal to 𝜂𝑀, we have
(1 − 𝛼) [𝑃1𝜂𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇
′ − 𝐿𝑓𝐷] = 𝐺
′ − 𝑇 ′ + 𝜂𝑀 = 𝜂𝑀.
Then,
𝐺′ − 𝑇 ′ = 0.
From this we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. If 𝜂𝐿 = 𝐿𝑓 , that is, the full-employment state is realized in the next
period, we do not need budget deficit to maintain full-employment.
Demand and supply of money
The demand for money is the sum of
1. savings of the younger generation,
2. tax payment for government expenditure,
3. tax payment for pay-as-you-go pension,
4. repayment of scholarship,
5. repayment of other debt.
The supply of money is the sum of
1. consumption of the older generation,
2. government expenditure,
3. pay-as-you-go pension,
4. scholarship
5. lending by the younger generation,
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At the steady state where the prices of the goods are constant, we have
repayment of debt other than scholarship=lending by the younger generation,
repayment of scholarship=supply of scholarship,
However, if the employment and output increases at the rate 𝜂 − 1 > 0, we have
savings of the younger generation = 𝜂 × consumption of the older generation.
Moreover, the argument above implies
tax payment for government expenditure − government expenditure
=(1 − 𝜂) × consumption of the older generation.
Therefore, the demand formoney is equal to the supply ofmoney. Money supply
increases by “(𝜂 − 1) × consumption of the older generation’,’ which is equal to the
budget deficit, under constant prices of the goods.
4.3. Steady state with an increase in employment under inflation or deflation
We consider a steady state where the output 𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) increase at the rate 𝜂 − 1,
and the prices of the goods rise or fall at the rate 𝜌 − 1. If 𝜌 > 1(< 1), consumers
correctly predict that the prices rise (fall). Let 𝑇 be the tax revenue which is not
necessarily equal to 𝐺. Then,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? − 𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺 + 𝐿𝑓 ?ˆ? + 𝑀.
At the steady sate, ?ˆ? = 𝜌𝐷 and ?ˆ? = 𝜌𝑄. Thus,
𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) = 𝛼[𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙) − 𝑇 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + (𝜌 − 1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] + 𝐺 + 𝜌𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝑀.
The savings of the younger generation including the pay-as-you-go pension must
be equal to 𝜌𝜂𝑀. Therefore,
(1−𝛼) [𝑃1𝐿𝑙 𝑦(𝐿𝑙)−𝑇−𝐿𝑓𝐷+(𝜌−1)𝐿𝑓𝑄] = 𝐺−𝑇+(𝜌−1) (𝐿𝑓𝐷+𝐿𝑓𝑄)+𝑀 = 𝜌𝜂𝑀.
This means that:
𝐺 − 𝑇 = (𝜌𝜂 − 1)𝑀 − (𝜌 − 1)(𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄).
We approximate 𝜌𝜂 by 𝜌 + 𝜂 − 1. Then,
𝐺 − 𝑇 = (𝜂 − 1)𝑀 + (𝜌 − 1)(𝑀 − 𝐿𝑓𝐷 − 𝐿𝑓𝑄)
Without an increase in output (𝜂 = 1), if 𝑀 > 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄, in order to maintain
the steady state with falling prices (𝜌 < 1) (rising prices (𝜌 > 1)) a budget surplus
(deficit) is required. If 𝑀 < 𝐿𝑓𝐷 + 𝐿𝑓𝑄, we obtain the inverse results. Similarly
to the previous case we need a budget deficit (𝜂 − 1)𝑀 to realize an increase in
employment.
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4.4. Discussion
From Propositions 1 and 2 we can say that in order to realize full-employment
from a state with involuntary unemployment we need budget deficit of the gov-
ernment. However, when full-employment is realized, in order to maintain full-
employment we need balanced budget. Therefore, additional government expendi-
ture to realize fill-employment should be financed by seigniorage not public debt. If
it is financed by public debt, this debt should not be redeemed. It should be bought
by the central bank.
5. Is involuntary unemployment a Nash equilibrium?
We simplify themodel up to the previous section to see if involuntary unemploy-
ment occurs in the Nash equilibrium. We consider a model with two generations.
We assume the following economy. There is one good, one firm, and two younger
consumers. Each consumer supplies one unit of labor and the firm produces one
unit of the good with one unit of labor. There is only one firm, but it acts competi-
tively, and the price of the good is equal to the nominal wage rate.
1. Consider the following pair of strategies for the firm and consumers. Let
0 ≤ 𝑡 ≤ 2.5.
Firm: employs one younger consumer and produces one unit of
the good.
Employed younger consumer: supplies one unit of labor, buys and
consumes 0.5 units of the good, pays 2𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-
you-go pension for the older generation, and keeps the rest of his
income.
Unemployed younger consumer: consumption is zero.
Also, there are older consumers who buy 0.5 units of the good in total. 2𝑡
units of the good are purchased by pension.
Is the above pair of strategies in a Nash equilibrium? 0.5 units of employed
consumers’ consumption is due to utility maximization.
Firm: given the actions of the older consumers and the actions of
employed and unemployed consumers it is optimal to employ one
consumer and produce one unit of the good.
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Employed younger consumer: assuming he is employed, one unit
of labor supply and consumption of 0.5 units of the good are the
optimal strategies.
Unemployed younger consumer: assuming he is not employed,
zero consumption is optimal.
The above confirms the existence of involuntary unemployment in the Nash
equilibrium.
In this case even if unemployed consumer consumes 0.5 units of the good,
the firm does not produce two units of the good and full-employment is not
achieved because the older consumers consume 0.5 units of the good in total.
2. If the government purchases 0.5 units of the good (financed by seigniorage),
the following pair of strategies will be in the Nash equilibrium.
Firm: employs two younger consumers and produces two units of
the good.
Employed younger consumer 1: supplies one unit of labor, buys
and consumes 0.5 units of the good, pays 𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-
you-go pension for the older generation, and keeps the rest of his
income.
Employed younger consumer 2: supplies one unit of labor, buys
and consumes 0.5 units of the good, pays 𝑡 units of tax for pay-as-
you-go pension for the older generation, and keeps the rest of his
income.
Also, the older consumers buy 0.5 units of the good in total. 2𝑡 units of the
good are purchased by pension.
3. In the next period, above pair of strategies is in theNash equilibriumwith one
unit of consumption by the older generation in total and zero government
expenditure.
Three generations model without pension
Consider a case where there are childhood period consumers, and no pay-as-
you-go pension. Then, the following pair of strategies is in the Nash equilibrium.
Firm: employs one younger consumer and produces one unit of the
good.
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Employed younger consumer: supplies one unit of labor, buys and con-
sumes 0.3 units of the good, repays 0.2 units of debt, pays 0.2 units of
tax for unemployment benefit, and keeps the rest of his income.
Unemployed younger consumer: consumption is zero.
Also, there are 0.4 units of consumption by childhood consumers, and 0.3 units of
consumption by the older generation in total.
If the government purchases 0.5 units of the good (financed by seigniorage), the
following pair of strategies will be in the Nash equilibrium.
Firm: employs two younger consumers and produces two units of the
good.
Employed younger consumer 1: supplies one unit of labor, buys and
consumes 0.4 units of the good, repays 0.2 units of debt, and keeps the
rest of his income.
Employed younger consumer 2: supplies one unit of labor, buys and
consumes 0.4 units of the good, repays 0.2 units of debt, and keeps the
rest of his income.
Also, there are 0.4 units of consumption by childhood consumers, and 0.3 units of
consumption by the older generation in total.
In the next period, above pair of strategies is in the Nash equilibrium with 0.8
units of consumption by the older generation in total and zero government expen-
diture.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have examined the existence of involuntary umemployment and the effects
of fiscal policy using a three-generation OLG model under monopolistic compe-
tition with increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale. We considered the
case of an indivisible labor supply, and we assumed that the good is produced only
by labor.
In future research, we want to analyze involuntary unemployment and fiscal
policy in a situation where goods are produced by capital and labor, and there exist
investment of firms.
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